In this paper we are interested in efficient and secure constant round multi-party protocols which provide unconditional security against so called honest-but-curious adversaries. In particular, we design a novel constant round protocol that converts from shares over Z q to shares over the integers working for all shared inputs from Z q . Furthermore, we present a constant round protocol to securely evaluate a shared input on a public polynomial whose running time is linear in the degree of the polynomial. The proposed solution makes use of Chebyshev Polynomials. We show that the latter two protocols can be used to design efficient constant round protocols for the following natural problems: a mod q given shares of x, a and q. Prior to this paper, for all the above mentioned problems, there were in general no efficient constant round protocols known providing unconditional security.
Contents 1 Introduction
In this work we consider the problem of secure multi-party computation. Here n players (each holding a secret input) want to compute an agreed functionality in such a way that the correct result is computed (correctness) and that the protocol does not reveal any information about the secret inputs (privacy). The two properties should also hold in presence of an adversary who is allowed to corrupt some of the players.
There are basically three important measures of complexity for multi-party protocols, namely the bit complexity (the number of elementary bit operations every player has to perform), the communication complexity (total number of bits sent) and the round complexity (where a round is a phase where each player is allowed to send one message to each other player). In this paper we focus on the round complexity of multi-party protocols. In particular, we build constantround protocols.
For conditionally secure multi-party protocols [Yao82] (in the complexity theoretic model), Yao [Yao86] showed that in the two-party case any probabilistic polynomial-time functionality can be efficiently and privately evaluated in a constant number of rounds. The protocol uses secure computations based on a complexity theoretic assumption. These results were later extended to the multi-party case [GMW91] .
For unconditionally secure multi-party protocols [BGW88, CCD88] (in the information theoretic model), the situation is different. Up to now it is not known yet which functions can be efficiently computed in a constant number of rounds. General results started with Bar-Ilan and Beaver [BIB89] who showed that any algebraic formula can be computed efficiently and in a constant number of rounds. Later results by Feige, Kilian and Naor [FKN94] and Ishai and Kushilevitz [IK97, IK00] and Beaver [Bea00] extend this to functions in NL (nondeterministic logspace) and some related counting classes.
Related Work
We say that a protocol securely computes a function f , if, given shares of a finite field element x as input, it outputs shares of f (x) (without revealing anything else). Here f is a public function defined over some field. The two papers that are probably most related to ours are [ACS02, CD01] . In the work of Cramer and Damgård [CD01] , efficient constant round multi-party protocols for various problems coming from linear algebra were studied (computing the determinant, solving linear equations, etc). Their protocols heavily rely on a sub-protocol (called Π 1 therein) for securely computing the equality function δ(x) which is defined as one if x equals to zero and as zero otherwise. This problem actually is much older, it first appeared in [BIB89] as the related normalization function, which tells whether two elements are equal or not. Cramer and Damård give two different constant-round implementations to securely compute this function. The first protocol (generalizing a protocol from [BIB89] ) is only efficient if the characteristic of the underlying finite field is small enough (i.e., polynomial in the bit-length of order of the field). The second protocol uses shares of the binary representation of x as input to securely compute δ (using general circuit techniques). However, given only shares of x over the finite field it was an open problem to compute shares of the binary representation of x. Hence both approaches do not lead to a general efficient protocol. Cramer and Damgård leave it as an open problem to give an efficient constant-round protocol for securely computing the equality function δ on general finite fields (of possibly large characteristic).
For the finite field Z q (the integers modulo a prime q), Algesheimer, Camenisch and Shoup [ACS02] present a protocol that securely computes all bits of the binary representation of an input value and a protocol for secure modulo reduction. Both protocols are efficient but do not run in a constant number of rounds. Applications for their results can be found in the area of threshold cryptography, in particular secure generation of shared primes.
A small bug in the protocol converting polynomial to integer shares (i.e. in the Proof of Lemma 5.5) in an earlier version of this paper [Kil05] has been fixed in this update.
In independent work and using different techniques, Damgård et al [DFNT05] come up with an efficient constant-round protocol that computes shares of the binary representation of a shared input.
Our Contribution
In multi-party protocols it is often necessary to switch between field and integer representations of the shares. Our main technical contribution is a novel conversion protocol from shares over Z q to integer shares. Our protocol works for arbitrary shared inputs x ∈ Z q . This improves on a result from [ACS02] were the shared input x had to be upper bounded by q/n2 ρ to guarantee correctness and privacy (here ρ is a security parameter).
For the special case where the finite field is Z q our unrestricted conversion protocol enables us to design efficient constant-round protocols for all the problems mentioned in the last paragraph. In particular, we give efficient constant round protocols for securely computing the following tasks:
• The equality function δ. This solves the open problem from Cramer and Damgård [CD01] for the interesting case where the underlying finite field is Z q .
• The comparison function, indicating if an input value is greater than zero or not. 1
• All bits of the binary representation.
• Modulo reduction (with respect to a public/shared modulus).
• Exponentiation (with respect to public/shared exponent and modulus).
Our key technique to obtain the constant round protocols is Lagrange Interpolation. Loosely speaking, Lagrange interpolation enables us to efficiently compute arbitrary functions defined on a small domain since such functions can be expressed as a low degree polynomials. To this end we design a protocol that securely evaluates a public polynomial with running time linear in its degree. Until now this was only possible in quadratic time. Our approach makes use of Chebyshev polynomials and may be useful elsewhere. A comparison of our results with the previously known results is given in Fig. 1 in Appendix C. We emphasize that all our multi-party protocols run in a constant number of rounds. Furthermore, they are secure and efficient in the sense that the running time and the communication complexity are bounded by a polynomial in the bit-size k = log q of the order of the finite field and in the number of players n. The need of low round complexity is motivated by the fact that in most practical systems the time spent on sending and receiving messages is large compared to local computation time. Therefore it is of great importance to reduce the round complexity to a minimum possible.
From a theoretical point of view our results extend the class of functions for which there exist efficient unconditionally secure constant-round multi-party protocols. Since the functions we consider are very basic we think that our results may help bringing forward the general understanding of constant-round unconditional multi-party protocols. In some cases the protocols are quite complex. We find it interesting to see that obviously simple problems seem to be very tricky to perform and that it requires a lot of work.
Possible applications of our results are manifold and naturally arise when both unconditional security and a low number of communication rounds between the players are required. For instance consider algorithms performing a conditional "if then else" directive. They may now be implemented in a secure multi-party protocol using our protocols for comparison and equality. Another natural application is threshold cryptography where a secret key is shared among the players. To mention some examples, our protocol for secure exponentiation may be useful in Diffie-Hellman or RSA like threshold schemes. In fact, with our techniques all protocols mentioned in [ACS02] can now efficiently implemented in constant rounds. 2 Consider a simple yes/no voting scheme where in the end we want to know if the majority of the players voted for yes or no without having to reveal the votes. Votes (consisting of shares of zero or one) can be added using secure addition over a finite field. After adding the votes we securely compute the bit indicating if the sum of the votes exceeds a certain threshold or not.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notation and sketch the security model. A more formal definition of security is given in Appendix A. In Section 3 we state our main results. The polynomial evaluation protocol is explained in Section 4 and the unrestricted conversion protocol in Section 5. In Appendix 6 we explain in more detail how to apply our main results to give efficient constant-round protocols for the tasks mentioned in the last paragraph. Finally, after giving some missing proofs in Appendix B, a comparison with the previously known results is done in Appendix C.
Preliminaries

Notation
By a we denote that largest integer b ≤ a, by a the largest integer b ≤ a + 1/2. Let q be a prime. We define the set Z q as the set {0, . . . , q − 1}. We emphasize that Z q is mainly viewed as a set rather than a ring. By a mod q we always mean the smallest non-negative integer 0 ≤ a ≤ q − 1 such that a = a − rq for an integer r ∈ Z. Every number x ∈ Z q can be written as x = k i=0 2 i x i , with x i ∈ {0, 1} and k = log q . The value x i is denoted by bit i (x), the i th bit. The value x 0 is also sometimes called the least significant bit of x and denoted by lsb(x). We denote additive shares over Z q of a value a ∈ Z q by ( a q j ) 1≤j≤n where a = n j=1 a q j mod q (the share held by player j is a q j ). For a prime q > n , we denote by
q j mod q, where λ J j are the Lagrange interpolation coefficients with respect to a set J of honest players of cardinality at least τ + 1. For a ∈ Z we denote by ( a Z j ) 1≤j≤n ∈ Z n additive shares of a over the integers, i.e., a = n j=1 a Z j . Note that the polynomial shares over Z q are τ + 1-out-of-n shares, whereas the additive shares are n-out-of-n shares.
We make the following notation: the term a j ← PROTOCOL q (b j ; P ) means that player j running the (possibly probabilistic) protocol PROTOCOL q with local input b j and public input P gets (after possible interaction with the other players) local output a j as a result of the run of the protocol. In all cases the local inputs and outputs consist of shares over Z q or the integers.
Model
We consider n players that are connected by secure and authenticated channels. Our protocols are secure against a static and honest-but-curious (a.k.a. semi-honest) behaving adversary controlling up to τ = (n − 1)/2 players. Honest but curious means that all players follow the given protocol honestly but the dishonest fraction of the players is allowed to pool their data together and try to derive additional information. Security is granted in a statistical sense and does not rely on computational assumptions. Informally we say that a a multi-party protocol privately computes shares of f (x) (here f is a public function and the secret x is shared among the players), if the output of the protocol consists of random shares of f (x) (consistency) and if no adversary (controling up to τ players) can learn more information than it could itself derive from its local inputs and outputs during the execution of the protocol (privacy). In the honestbut-curious model it can be shown that privacy is preserved under non-concurrent modular composition of protocols [Can00] . The latter composition theorem will be the main source of our privacy proofs. Since we tried to state our protocols in a rather informal way we postpone the exact definition of security (which we only need in Appendix B to prove Lemma 5.3) to Appendix A.
Known Primitives Used
We remind the reader of some known private multi-party protocols for efficient distributed computation with shared secrets that we will use to compose our protocols. The running time of our protocols will be given in terms of bit operations in k = log q and n. We refer to the term efficient as polynomial time in n and k. We adopt the general convention [ACS02] that multiplying two elements from Z q takes Θ(k 2 ) bit operations. Let k = log q. We abbreviate B(n, k) = O(nk 2 + kn 2 log n) and refer to it as the number of bit operations needed to perform basic operations (such as multiplication and inversion) on shares over Z q .
Additive Shares over Z q . To share a secret x ∈ Z q , player j chooses random x 
where ρ is a security parameter, and sets x Z j = x − i =j a Z i , and sends a Z i to player i. Note that for any set of n − 1 players, the distribution of shares of different secrets are statistically indistinguishable for suitable large ρ. This takes O(n(ρ + log A)) bit operations. Note that the distribution of the shares depends on the interval [−A, A].
Basic operations. Addition and multiplication by a constant modulo q of (polynomial or additive) shares is done by letting all players privately add or multiply the constant to their shares modulo q. These operations take O(k) and O(k 2 ) bit operations, respectively. Multiplication modulo q of two polynomial shares can be done using a protocol from [BGW88] or a more efficient variant from [GRR98] which requires O(B(n, k)) bit operations. We denote this protocol by
Joint random shares over Z q . To generate shares of a secret random element from Z q , each player chooses a random number r j ∈ Z q and shares it according to the required type of sharing scheme. Then each player adds up all the obtained shares modulo q to obtain the share of a random value. We denote this protocol by JRP q for polynomial shares. It requires O(kn 2 log n) bit operations.
Joint random shares of zero over the integers. This protocol can be done by letting each player create random shares of zero over the integers with respect to the interval [−A, A].
Then each player adds up all his shares to get shares of zero. We denote this protocol by JRIZ ρ (A) and it requires O(k(ρ + log A)) bit operations.
Inversion. Computing the inverse of a polynomially shared element x ∈ Z * q is done by the following protocol due to Bar-Ilan and Beaver [BIB89] . First the players run the protocol Unbounded fan-in multiplication. Computing the product of (polynomially) many polynomially shared elements x 1 , . . . , x m from Z * q in constant rounds is done as follows [BIB89] . We only consider the case where all elements are non-zero, the general case can be reduced to this case with computational overhead of a factor m [BIB89, BOC92, CD01]. First the players generate m shares of random and independent non-zero values r i and compute shares of their inverses r 
Main Results
The main technical achievement of our paper is the following:
Theorem 3.1 Let random polynomial shares of x ∈ Z q be given. Then there exists a protocol that privately computes random additive shares of x over the integers.
Our protocol runs in a constant number of rounds and O((kn 2 + k 3 )B(n, k)) bit operations. A previous solution ([ACS02], see also Theorem 5.1) has the drawback that privacy can only be guaranteed for shared inputs upper bounded by q/n2 ρ , where ρ is a security parameter. Our solution comes without restrictions to the shared secret. We pay that with an additional factor kn 2 + k 3 in the running time compared to the solution from [ACS02] . The exact description of the protocol, the analysis and a comparison with the existing solution is given in Section 5.
Theorem 3.2 Let random polynomial shares of x ∈ Z q (possibly zero) and a public polynomial F ∈ Z q [X] of degree d be given. Then there exists a protocol that privately computes random polynomial shares of F (x) mod q.
The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds. It takes O(dB(n, k)) bit operations. The improvement over the previously known solution is a factor of d in the running time. The exact description of the protocol and its analysis is given in Section 4.
Theorem 3.1 can be used to prove the following:
Theorem 3.3 Given random polynomial shares of x, y, p ∈ Z q (where p is of public bit-size k 0 < k), then there exist efficient constant round multi-protocols that privately compute random polynomial shares of each of the following functions f (x, y, p):
• The equality function f (x) = δ(x) which is zero if x equals zero and one otherwise.
• The binary representation
• The comparison function which outputs zero if x ≥ y and one otherwise
• The modulo function f (x, p) = x mod p.
• The exponentiation function f (x, y, p) = x y mod p.
For both the modulo function and the exponentiation function there exist more efficient protocols if the modulus p and/or the exponent y is public.
The protocol for computing shares of comparison function is discussed in Section 5.1 (as part of the proof of Theorem 3.1).The full proof of Theorem 3.3 (including the respective protocols) is given in Section 6. See also Appendix C for the running-time of the protocols and for a comparison with the existing solutions.
Secure Polynomial Evaluation
In this section we provide the protocol corresponding to Theorem 3.2 and prove its correctness and privacy.
We want to evaluate a polynomial F in a shared value x. First we present a naive protocol based on known techniques. It is basically a variant of unbounded fan-in multiplication (to compute shares of x i = x i mod q in parallel) combined with dynamic programming to reuse already computed values. As we will see, the protocol leaks information for shared inputs of zero.
Each player j performs the following steps:
q to generate polynomial shares of random non-zero elements y i ∈ Z q and compute shares of its inverses [y
We get the following theorem whose security follows by the security of the sub-protocols used.
Lemma 4.1 Given random polynomial shares ([x]
q j ) 1≤j≤n of a non-zero element x ∈ Z * q , and
q j ; F ) privately computes random polynomial shares of F (x) mod q.
The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds (note that in the loop of step three there is no communication needed). It takes O(dB(n, k)) bit operations. Correctness follows (similar to the unbounded fan-in multiplication) by the identity y i−1 xy i mod q) the protocol leaks information when the polynomial is evaluated in zero inputs x.
As already done in [BIB89] , using a technique from [BOC92] , the general case (where the input may equals to zero) can be reduced to unbounded fan-in multiplication of invertible 3 × 3 matrices as we will sketch now. Later we will give an alternative protocol for the same task with improved running time. The main result from [BOC92] states that every algebraic formula Φ of depth l can be expressed as the product of O(4 l ) invertible 3 × 3 matrices over Z q (in the sense that the value Φ(x) can be read from the right top corner of the matrix product). Since any polynomial F (X) of degree d can be expressed as an algebraic formula of depth log d, F (X) can be expressed as the product of O(d 2 ) such invertible 3 × 3 matrices. The appearing matrices are either one of five (known) constant matrices or are the identity matrix with x in the right upper corner. Using an efficient constant round protocol for multiplying invertible constant size matrices (by performing component-wise multiplication; see, e.g., [BIB89, Bea00]), we imply that there there exists a protocol that privately computes random polynomial shares of F (x) mod q, where x may equal to zero. The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds and it takes O(d 2 B(n, k)) bit operations.
We now come to our improvement. We design an alternative protocol with running time linear in d (instead of quadratic). We use Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind which satisfy the linear recurrence
with starting values T 0 (x) = 1 and T 1 (x) = x and Chebyshev polynomials of the second kind
with starting values U 0 (x) = 1 and U 1 (x) = 2x. It is well known that that the Chebyshev polynomials T i (x), 0 ≤ i ≤ d form a basis for all polynomials of degree at most d. I.e., there exist coefficients λ i ∈ Z q such that every polynomial F of degree at most d given in its monomial representation F (x) = d i=0 a i x i can be expressed in the Chebyshev basis as
The coefficients λ i only depend on F and the modulus q, but not on x. All λ i 's can be computed from the a i 's in O(d 2 log 2 q) bit operations (using, for instance, the recursive formulas from [Kro70] ).
For x ∈ Z q define the 2 × 2 matrix M (x) over Z q as
and note that M (x) is invertible for each x ∈ Z q (even for the interesting case x = 0). The following identity is easy to show by induction over d:
Now a protocol to securely evaluate a given public polynomial F of degree d modulo a prime q is straight forward as follows: In a precomputation phase each player computes the interpolation coefficients λ i ∈ Z q and stores them in the memory. When the actual protocol is run, the players first create shares of the invertible matrices M (x) and M (2x), given shares of the secret input x. Then they compute (component-wise and in parallel) shares of the matrices M (x)M i−1 (2x) for 1 ≤ i ≤ d (as in Lemma 4.1). Security is granted since M (x) and M (2x) are invertible. By Eq. (1), shares of the value T i (x) can now be read in the upper left corner of the resulting matrices. In the last step the players compute shares of
Unrestricted Conversion between Different Shares
In this section we prove Theorem 3.1. We start recalling the reader one of our central tools, the Lagrange Interpolation. Let P be a set of points P = {(x i , y i ), 0 ≤ i ≤ d} with (x i , y i ) ∈ Z q × Z q for pairwise distinct x i 's. Then it is well known that there exists an unique polynomial F ∈ Z q [X] of degree at most d satisfying F (x i ) = y i for all 0 ≤ i ≤ d. The polynomial F is explicitly given by the formula
where the γ i (X)'s are called the Lagrange interpolation polynomials. The coefficients of γ i (X) only depend on the set P and on the modulus q. Computing the coefficients of F (X) takes O(k 2 d log 2 d log log d) bit operations [GG99, Chap.10]. It is well known how to convert additive shares over Z q into polynomial shares over Z q and vice versa. If the players hold τ + 1-out-of-n polynomial shares over Z q of a value x they re-share those with n-out-of-n additive shares over Z q and send the shares to the respective players, which interpolate the received shares to obtain additive shares. If the players hold n-out-of-n additive shares over Z q they re-share those with τ + 1-out-of-n polynomial shares over Z q and send the shares to the respective players, which add up the received shares to obtain polynomial shares. Converting additive shares over the integers to additive shares over Z q is done by simply taking all entries modulo q. Note that it is naturally required that the secret is bounded by the modulus.
Converting additive (or polynomial) shares of x over Z q to additive shares over the integers turns out to be the hardest of all conversions. The problem is here that if one only considers the additive shares over Z q as additive shares over the integers then the resulting secret may be off by a multiple of the modulus q:
for an integer 0 ≤r ≤ n, wherer = n i=1 x q i /q . So the problem reduces to (somehow, privately) computing this valuer. It is well known (see, e.g., [DMS94] ) that considering the first O(log n) most significant bits of each share x q j is sufficient for computingr if x itself is not "too big". Now the observation is that unless again x is too big, each player j can reveal these bits without revealing anything about the common secret x. This fact was used in [ACS02] . Here we present their protocol using a different representation of Z q . Before we present the protocol we introduce the following notation: π j (r) = 1 for j ≤ r and π j (r) = 0 for j > r.
Protocol
The protocol uses O(B(n, k)) bit operations and it runs in a constant number of rounds. Note that the protocol violates the privacy property when the shared input exceeds the bound q/n2 ρ . This is since the values a j (the log n most significant bits of the additive shares) are made public by every player, thereby disclosing parts of his secret share. We present a modification that overcomes this problem.
In the rest of this section we work towards the final unrestricted conversion protocol. This is done in three steps, each step building on the previous one: First, based on ideas of the original conversion protocol SQ2SI q ρ (·), we present a modification (called SQ2SI 1 q ρ (·)) to weaken the bound on the size of the shared input to q/2 ρ (dropping the factor n). Second, we use this new protocol to create another conversion protocol (called SQ2SI 2 q ρ (·)) that works for shared input values up to q/2 (dropping the factor 2 ρ−1 ). The latter protocol also has the property that it always outputs shares of (the correct value) c or c − q. For the final unrestricted conversion protocol it leaves to show how to (privately) distinguish between the two cases. This is done using binary circuits. In order to apply the circuit technique, a protocol to compute shares of the binary representation of c (or c − q) is constructed in Section 5.1.
To simplify our presentation we make the (technical) assumption that the prime q is large enough with respect to the number of parties n and the security parameter ρ, i.e. we assume
Let ( c q j ) 1≤j≤n be additive shares of c ∈ Z q such that c = 
for some integerr = P n i=1 c q j q with 0 ≤r < n. The following lemma shows that in some cases the value r = 2 t P n i=1 a i q + 1 2 equals tor.
Lemma 5.2 With the above notation, let a j = c q j /2 t with t = log q − log n − 1 . Then r ∈ {r,r + 1}. Furthermore, if 0 ≤ c < q/2, then r =r.
Proof: By Eq. (5) we have c = n j=1 c q j −rq for some integer 0 ≤r < n. By division with remainder write c q j as 2 t a j +b j with b j < 2 t ≤ q/2n. Note that b j contains the q/2 t = Θ(n) most significant bits of c q j . Moreover we have n j=1 b j = n j=1 c q j −2 t n j=1 a j = c+rq −2 t n j=1 a j and thus 2 t n j=1 a j = c +rq − n j=1 b j . This implies
where the last equation holds sincer is an integer. Observe that by the choice of the parameter t we have 0 ≤ b j /q < n2 t /q < 1/2. For arbitrary values c ∈ Z q we have 0 ≤ c/q < 1 and therefore r ∈ {r,r + 1}. For 0 ≤ c < q/2 we can use the sharper bound c/q < 1/2 to get r =r. Now we modify the protocol SQ2SI q ρ (·) as follows. Let the values a j and r as in Lemma 5.2 and let a = n j=1 a j . Note that each a j is bounded by q/2 t ≤ 4n and so a is bounded by 4n 2 . Instead of computing the value r by publishing the value a i to all players we compute r using polynomial interpolation: Let P be the unique interpolation polynomial over Z q of degree 4n 2 through the points {(z,
. We use Theorem 3.2 to securely evaluate the polynomial P in the shared a. Efficiency is granted since the degree of P is relatively small. 
Compute [a]
3. Let P be the unique interpolation polynomial over Z q of degree 4n 2 through the set of points The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds. The running time of protocol is dominated by the polynomial interpolation step and is bounded by O(n 2 B(n, k)) bit operations. The full proof of Lemma 5.3 is given in Appendix B.
The straight forward idea for the next step is to completely hide the value r. This enables us to construct a protocol that does the conversion privately for all possible shared inputs. Unfortunately, concerning correctness, Lemma 5.2 is the barrier and for half of the shared inputs the result of the conversion may be off by an additive factor of q. We may now describe the protocol.
Protocol SQ2SI 2 q ρ ( c q j ). Put t = log q − log n − 1 . Each player j performs the following steps:
1. Compute a j = c q j /2 t and distribute random polynomial shares ([a j ] q i ) 1≤i≤n of a j to the resp. players.
3. Let P be the interpolation polynomial of degree 4n 2 through the set of points {(z,
q j ; P ). 4. Convert the pol. shares of r to additive shares over Z: The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds and uses O(n 2 B(n, k)) bit operations.
Proof: Correctness follows as in the proof of Lemma 5.3, now the shares computed in step three are shares of r ∈ {r,r + 1} with r =r if 0 ≤ c < q/2. By Lemma 5.3 the application of the protocol SQ2SI 1 q ρ ( r q j ) in step 4 is secure since 0 ≤ r < n < q/2 ρ (the latter inequality holds by Eq. (4)). Therefore ( r Z j ) 1≤j≤n are random additive shares of r over the integers and The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds and uses O ((kn log n + k 3 )B(n, k) ) bit operations. The proof of Lemma 5.5 is postponed to the next subsection. Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Let ([x]
q j ) 1≤j≤n be random polynomial shares of x ∈ Z q . First convert them to additive shares ( x 
Proof of Lemma 5.5
We want to prove Lemma 5.5, i.e. give a protocol that computes shares of the comparison bit d given additive shares of x over the integers.
Any k-bit number is uniquely determined by its residues modulo polynomially many primes, each having O(log k) bits. The Prime Number Theorem guarantees that there will be more than enough primes of that length. More precisely, let p 1 , . . . , p m be m primes with p i = Θ(k). Let P = p i . Any number x < P can be represented uniquely by the sequence (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with x = x i mod p i for all i. We call the sequence (x 1 , . . . , x m ) the CRR of x. More precisely, to compute the CRR of a k + 1 bit integer
At a high level, the protocol for computing shares of the comparison function works as follows. Given integer shares of x ∈ Z q , we first compute polynomial shares of the CRR (x 1 , . . . , x m ) of x. Second, we compute shares of the binary representation of each of the values x i (1 ≤ i ≤ m). This can be done efficiently (using polynomial interpolation) since all the x i 's are small. By a result from [DMS94] there exists an NL algorithm that, given the (binary representation of the) CRR of x and q, decides if x > q or not. We apply the generic NL technique from [FKN94] to compute shares of the bit d.
We now give more details. Given integer shares of x ∈ Z q , we compute polynomial shares of the CRR of x. That is, we compute shares of x i = x mod p i over Z p i in parallel for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. This is done by letting each player j take his additive share b Z j modulo p i to get additive shares of x i over Z p i . The resulting shares are converted into polynomial shares over Z p i .
In the second step we compute shares of the binary representation of all the values x i using polynomial interpolation. For each prime p i (1 ≤ i ≤ m = O(k)) and each bit j (0 ≤ j ≤ log p i ), this can be done using O(p i · B(n, k)) bit operations, where p i = O(k). Performing all interpolations in parallel this sums up to O(k 2 log k · B(n, k)) bit operations.
Note that the definition of polynomial shares over p i formally requires that p i > n. Since p i = Θ(k) we need k ≥ n. In case k ≤ n we choose all primes p i such that p i = Θ(n) and the running time sums up to O(kn log n · B(n, k)) bit operations.
Hence computing shares of the binary representation of the CRR of x can be computed in O((kn log n + k 2 log k)B(n, k)) bit operations.
By a result from Dietz, Macarie and Seiferas [DMS94] we know that there exists a spaceefficient algorithm that, given the CRR of a value x, computes the comparison bit d:
Theorem 5.6 From its residues modulo p 1 , . . . , p m , we can decide in space O(log log P ) the relative order of two numbers less than P = m i=1 p i .
Using this observation we apply the generic constant-round NL multi-party protocol by Feige, Kilian and Naor [FKN94] to securely compute shares of the binary representation of d.
The NL protocol takes l = O(k) input bits (all the bits of the binary representation of the CRR of x). The binary representation of q can be hard-wired into the protocol.
It exploits the fact that every problem in NL can be reduced to s-t-connectivity and s-tconnectivity can be reduced to matrix multiplication. It first creates 2l + 4 = O(l) invertible l × l matrices M i , the entries of each matrix consist either of constants or of one of the input bits. The matrices are created in such a way that the output bit of the NL computation can be read at a specific fixed position of the product of those matrices (say in the top right corner). These matrices are part of the reduction to s-t-connectivity and are described in [FKN94] in detail. Hence the problem reduces to securely computing the product of O(l) l × l matrices. With the techniques from Section 4 this can be done in constant rounds using O(l 3 B(n, k)) = O(k 3 B(n, k)) bit operations (O(l) multiplications of l × l matrices). The overall protocol takes O((k 3 + kn log n)B(n, k)) bit-operations. This completes the proof.
Equality, Comparison and Bits
In this section we present efficient constant round protocols for privately computing shares of equality, comparison, the binary representation and exponentiation. All protocols input and output polynomial shares over the field Z q . Our general strategy can be outlined as follows: we switch between the field representation and integer representation depending on the operation we want to perform in each step of the protocol (using the protocol implied by Theorem 3.1). Operations involving multiplication or polynomial evaluation are carried out over the finite field. On the other hand, for non-field operations like modulo computations we prefer working over integer shares. In the end we retransform into polynomial shares over Z q and output the result. Since in most cases we don't have control over the shared values we also can't guarantee an upper bound on them. Hence our unrestricted conversion protocol (Theorem 3.1) becomes one of the crucial ingredients for our strategy.
Comparison and Bits
The following theorem was implicitly proven in Section 5:
Theorem 6.1 Let random polynomial shares of x and y over Z q be given. There exists a protocol that privately computes random polynomial shares of the comparison bit indicating if x > y or not.
The protocol runs in constant rounds and uses O ((kn 2 + k 3 )B(n, k) ) bit operations. In [ACS02] an efficient protocol to compute shares of the binary representation was given that runs in O(log n + log k) rounds of communication and O(nkB(n, k)) bit operations using the generic circuit protocol from [BGW88] . We present a constant round protocol for the same task.
Theorem 6.2 Let random polynomial shares of x over Z q be given. Then there exists a protocol that privately computes random polynomial shares of the binary representation of x.
The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds and uses O ((kn 2 + k 4 )B(n, k) ) bit operations Actually, the last theorem can be combined with the circuit based results [BIB89, Bea00] to state a more general result:
Corollary 6.3 Let random polynomial shares of x over Z q be given. Let f : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} (when viewed as a circuit) be any function contained in the complexity class NL. Then there exists an efficient constant-round protocol that privately computes random polynomial shares of of f (x).
Theorem 6.2 is a simple corollary of Theorem 3.1 and the following Lemma:
Lemma 6.4 Let ( x Z j ) 1≤j≤n be random additive shares of 0 ≤ x < q over the integers. There exists a protocol that privately computes random polynomial shares of all bits bit i (b) ∈ {0, 1},
The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds and uses O((kn log n + k 4 )B(n, k)) bit operations.
Proof: The protocol uses the same techniques as the protocol in the proof of Lemma 5.5 (Section 5.1). The key ingredient is again the following space-efficient protocol by Dietz, Macarie and Seiferas [DMS94]:
Theorem 6.5 From its residues modulo p 1 , . . . , p k , we can sequentially generate all the bits of a number less than P = k i=1 p i , in space O(log log P ) if the bits of P are available.
Let shares of the binary representation of the CRR of x be given (they can be computed in O((kn log n + k 2 log k)B(n, k)) bit operations). For computing shares of each individual bit bit i (x), the problem again reduces to securely computing the product of O(k) matrices, what can be done in constant rounds using O(k 3 B(n, k)) bit operations. The protocol has to be run for each bit in parallel. Therefore the protocol that computes shares of all bits of the binary representation of x uses O(k 4 B(n, k)) bit operations.
Equality
Define the equality (to zero) function δ : Z q → {0, 1} as δ(x) = 1 if x = 0 and δ(x) = 0 otherwise. Since x = 0 iff x ∈ {0, . . . , (q − 1)/2} and −x = q − x ∈ {0, . . . , (q − 1)/2}, computing δ(x) is reducible to comparing x and −x = q − x to zero. Hence a protocol for Equality can be constructed by means of Theorem 6.1. Now we present an alternative approach using the Chinese Remainder Representation (CRR) which is more efficient.
Let (x 1 , . . . , x k ) be the CRR of 0 ≤ x < q. Clearly we have x = 0 iff x i = 0 mod p i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. This observation can be used to build an alternative constant round protocol for the equality function as follows: We assume that k ≥ n. First assume we are given random additive shares of x over the integers. For each prime p i do the following (in parallel):
• Compute random additive shares of x i = x mod p i over Z p i . 3
• By polynomial interpolation over Z p i compute z i = δ(x i ).
• Transform the polynomial shares of z i over Z p i first to random additive shares over the integers, then to polynomial shares over Z q . The first transformation can be carried out by the protocol SQ2SI 2
j ; 1) (with ρ = log p i ) since we know that z i ∈ {0, 1}.
Finally, we can compute shares of δ(x) as δ(x) = m i=1 (1 − δ(x mod p i )) using unbounded fan-in multiplication.
We count the bit operations for the protocol for each prime
The polynomial interpolation step takes p i B(n, log p i ) = O(k(log kn 2 log n + n log 2 k)) bit operations. The conversion protocol takes B(n, log p i ) bit operations. In total we get k 2 (log kn 2 log n + n log 2 k)) = k log kB(n, k) bit operations. So far we assumed to start with integer shares of x ∈ Z q . We now show how to deal with the case that we are given integer shares of b ∈ {x, x − q} obtained by the (more efficient) conversion protocol SQ2SI 2 q ρ ( x q j ). In this case we can run the above Chinese Remainder based protocol twice. The first time on integer shares of b, the second time on integer shares of b + q and return a share of zero if one of the two invocations of the protocol returns zero.
By the above observations we can extract the following theorem:
q j ) 1≤j≤n be random polynomial shares of x over Z q . Then there exists a protocol that privately computes random polynomial shares of δ(x) ∈ {0, 1}.
The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds. It takes O((k log k + n 2 )B(n, k)) bit operations.
Modulo Reduction
We are given a shared value x over Z q and a public integer p. The problem is to privately compute shares of (x mod p) over Z q . A constant-round multi-party protocol this task can be constructed using the methods of Section 5 as follows: First convert the shares of x to integer shares of x. This is basically computing shares of x mod q (here q is the modulus of the field). Then apply the same technique again to compute shares of (x mod p). The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds and takes O((kn 2 + k 3 )B(n, k)) bit operations.
Private Modulo Reduction
We are given a shared value x and a shared integer p of known bit-size k 0 < k over Z q . The problem is to privately compute shares of (x mod p) over Z q . There already exists an efficient protocol for this task due to [ACS02] but it does not run in a constant number of rounds. We quickly want to mention that combining the techniques of this paper with the results from [ACS02] and [KLML05] (the latter one approximates the fractional part of 1/p by a Taylor polynomial), we get an efficient constant round protocol for this problem.
Private Exponentiation
The exponentiation function over Z q is given by exp(x, a) = x a mod q. We first deal with the case where the exponent a is publicly known and the value x is given as shares. We want to compute shares of x a mod q over Z q . Assume there exists a protocol that outputs random shares of a random non-zero value r ∈ Z * q together with shares of its a th power r a mod q. Then a protocol to securely compute the exponentiation function is straight forward (using the Bar-Ilan and Beaver [BIB89] inversion trick): The parties run the protocol to get shares of a random (non-zero) r and r a . Then they multiply the shared r into the shared x to get shares of xr mod q, open the share, and every player individually computes y = (xr) a = x a r a mod q which then is again shared among the players. Now shares of x a are obtained by multiplying the shares of y by shares of r −a = (r a ) −1 mod q that can be obtained from the shares of r a mod q by the INV q (·) protocol. It is easy to see that this protocol is private as long as x = 0. We handle the case x = 0 as an "exception" using the equality function δ. Substitute x by x = x + δ(x)s, where s be a random value from Z * q . Note that this always assures x = 0. Then
We note that the "exception trick" can also be used in some other places (like in the inversion protocol) to handle special shared inputs that may lead to information leakage. Any protocol that initially leaks information for m different shared input values can now be updated to a protocol providing perfect privacy by the cost of additional O(m(n 2 + k log k)B(n, k)) bit operations. It leaves to provide a protocol that, given a public a, outputs shares of a random non-zero value r together with shares of its a th power r a mod q. In the honest-but-curious model this is simply done by letting every player j locally select a random non-zero value r j together with its a th power r a j . The values are shared to the players. Define r as the product of all r j modulo q such that r a also equals to the product of all r a j modulo q. Both products can be computed with the unbounded fan-in multiplication protocol. Now we consider the case where the exponent a comes also shared and show how this case can be reduced to the previous one. First run the bit protocol from Section 6.1 to obtain shares of the bits (a 0 , . . . a k ) of the exponent a such that a = k i=0 2 i a i . Then shares of x a mod q can be obtained via
Shares of x 2 i mod q can be securely computed (in parallel for 1 ≤ i ≤ k) with the exponentiation protocol above. Together with the results from Section 6.4 this enables us to build a constant round protocol that privately computes shares over Z q of x a mod p, where all three inputs, x, a, and p are given as shares (together with the bit-size k 0 of p). First reduce the shared x modulo the shared p and the shared a modulo the shared p − 1 with modulo reduction protocol from Section 6.4. Then choose the prime q large enough (of bit-size k 2 0 ) such that in Eq. (7) no wrap modulo q appears: after computing shares of x a over Z q , the modulo reduction protocol is used again to compute shares of x a mod p over Z q .
Computing any function in constant rounds
Using polynomial interpolation, Theorem 3.2 implies that any function f : Z q → Z q is securely computable in a constant number of rounds. However, the degree of f may be about q in which case the protocol has exponential running time. (In [BIB89] , a similar general theorem is obtained. Our result is more efficient in terms of the running time.)
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where r i denotes P i 's random input, and m i,j denotes the j th message received by Pi. We define
The outputs of P i during an execution of π( x) are denoted output π i ( x). We define
Definition A.1 [Privacy w.r.t. honest-but-curious adversaries] We say that π privately computes a function f if there exists a probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm S such that for every set of corrupted players I = {i 1 , . . . , i t } of cardinality |I| ≤ t,
where ≡ denotes statistical indistinguishability (with respect to a security parameter).
Equation (8) states that the view of the corrupted parties can be simulated given access to the corrupted party's input and output only. Recall that the adversary here is honest-but-curious and therefore the view is exactly according to the protocol definition. Note that it is not sufficient for simulator S to generate a string indistinguishable from view I ( x): the joint distribution of the simulator's output and the functionality output f ( x) must be indistinguishable from {view π I ( x), output π ( x)}. This is necessary for probabilistic functionalities [Gol04] . The inputs and outputs to our multi-party protocols will always be random shares, so the functionalities we consider will be probabilistic ones. It can be shown that security is preserved under nonconcurrent, modular composition of protocols [Can00] . Most of the time we will simply argue that by the composition theorem security follows directly from security of the sub-protocols used. A more formal treatment of composition in terms of "oracle aided protocols" is given in [Gol04] . Since we use (additive) n-out-of-n secret sharing schemes we have to assume that no player stops participating in the protocol prematurely. This may seem a strong requirement. However we want to point out that by the 'share back-up' method from Rabin [Rab98] one can obtain τ + 1-out-of-n secret sharing schemes. We do not pursue this possibility here.
Furthermore we want to mention that from a theoretical point of view the honest-but-curious model is not a real restriction since the players can be forced to behave honestly. This is done by having them to commit to their inputs, generate their individual random strings jointly, and prove (using proofs of knowledge) that they followed the protocols correctly. However, the corresponding proofs of knowledge are not always easy to find and in most cases are not very practical. Making our results robust against active adversaries is left as an open problem.
B Proof of Lemma 5.3
Proof: First we show correctness of the protocol, i.e. that it computes random additive shares over the integer of the integer c. The values a j computed in the second step of the protocol are bounded by 0 ≤ a j = c q j /2 t < q/2 k−log n−2 = 4n. So a = n j=1 a j is bounded by 4n 2 and no wrap around modulo q > 4n 2 (by Eq. (4)) can occur. In step three of the protocol shares of the function r = P (a) = n j=1 2 t a/q = n j=1 2 t c q j /2 t /q are computed. By Lemma 5.2 we have r =r and hence the protocol is correct.
In this protocol we don't simply combine secure sub-protocols, we actually give away secret information, namely the value r itself. Therefore we have to prove privacy in the sense of Definition A.1. We provide a simulator S(I, ( c It leaves to show that for the described simulator, the joint distribution of the simulator's output and the functionality and the view and output of the actual run of the protocol are statistical indistinguishable.
As already proved, the protocol correctly computes additive shares of the value c over the integers. We have to take care that the protocol's output distribution is statistically indistinguishable from the distribution of the (randomized) functionality we want to compute: random additive shares of c over the integers with respect to the interval [−A, A]. The latter one means that for every set I of n − 1 players, the distribution of the output values ( c Z j ) j∈I must be statistically indistinguishable from from independent and uniformly chosen values from the interval [−A2 ρ , A2 ρ ]. This is achieved by adding random integer shares of zero (coming from the JRIZ ρ (A) protocol) to the output. This shows that the distributions of the output of the protocol and the functionality are statistically indistinguishable.
Let us now show that the distribution of the r for different shared values c are statistically indistinguishable. The value r is given by r =r = [ ACS02] nk O(log n + k) Sec. 6.5 kn 2 + k 4 O(1) −, shared exp, mod [ACS02] k log k O(log n + log k) Sec. 6.5 poly(n, k) O(1) Figure 1 : Comparison of our results. Here n is the number of parties, k = log q is the bit-size of the underlying field. The running time is given as a multiple of B(n, k) = O(kn 2 log n + nk 2 ) (the time for basic operations on shares). The column "existing solution" refers to the prior to this paper most efficient protocol with respect to the lowest round complexity. The word "circuit" refers to the generic circuit evaluation protocol [BGW88] whose round complexity is linear in the circuit depth.
